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Lichtenfels: Indian Reserved Water Rights: An Argument for the Right to Export

COMMENT
INDIAN RESERVED WATER RIGHTS: AN
ARGUMENT FOR THE RIGHT TO EXPORT AND SELL
INTRODUCTION

Water is the life-line of the arid West. Its possession means political
and economic power.1 One study estimates that Indian water rights, many
of which are still unadjudicated, consist of about 45 million acre-feet per
year or three times the annual flow of the Colorado River.' As the demand
for water begins to exceed supply, focus on Indian water rights becomes
increasingly intense.' An issue currently inciting divisive discussion is
whether Indian water4 rights encompass the right to sell and export the
water off-reservation.
The federal government, in treaties, impliedly reserved Indian water
rights to ensure the future viability of the reservation as a permanent
homeland for the Indians.' Further, the firmly established doctrines of
tribal sovereignty and federal preemption limit states in restricting tribal
use of Indian water.
This comment examines the proper scope of Indian reserved water
rights. It first explores the purpose of the treaties which define the implied
water rights and concludes that their purpose was to create a permanent
homeland, making a per se restriction on sale or export of the reserved
water impermissible. Second, the relation of tribal sovereignty and federal preemption to state attempts to restrict the type of tribal water use
is evaluated. Third, a practical consideration of the situation suggests that
the various parties could benefit economically from allowing Indians to
export and sell their water. This comment then suggests that negotiation, rather than litigation, may offer the best resolution to this difficult
problem. Finally, the argument for reserved water export is applied to
the situation in Wyoming where the Wind River Indians' water rights
were recently adjudicated with Wyoming Supreme Court approval of a
prohibition on Indian water export.6
1. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 39

(1973) [here-

inafter NAT'L WATER CoMM'NI ("Water is basic to our economic growth." Development of
the water resource can have profound influence on regional development and population distribution).
2. Wilkinson, Western Water Law in Transition, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 317, 323 (1985)

(citing WESTERN

GOVERNORS' AssocIATION, INDIAN WATER RIGHTS IN THE WEST (1984)).

3. Trudell, Preface to AMERICAN INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM, INDIAN WATER
POLICY at 3 (1982). See generally Comment, Leasing Indian Water Off the Reservation: A
Use Consistent With the Reservation's Purpose, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 179 (1988).
4. Shupe, Off-Reservation Marketing of Indian Water, in NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY 1 (1988).

5. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908).
6. In Re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River
System, 753 P.2d 76, 100 (Wyo. 1988).
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BACKGROUND

Reserved Water Rights
The doctrine of federally reserved Indian water rights was first recognized in 1908 in Winters v. United States.7 In Winters, landowners
upstream from the Fort Belknap Reservation in Montana were diverting
water.' By so doing, they deprived the Indians of their asserted rights
to the Milk River which bordered the reservation.9 The Supreme Court
found that the government and the Indians intended that the reservation be a permanent homeland where the Indians could become a "civilized people."' 0 Further it found that the lands, being arid, were "practically valueless" without water." The Court refused to accept the logical inconsistency that the United States reserved lands for the Indians
without reserving the water necessary to give the lands any use or value.
Thus, it found that the federal government had impliedly reserved water
for the Indians.'" The holding does not mention the scope of permissible
uses except to say that they would continue "through years."' 3 In sum,
the Court established in Winters that when the United States creates an
Indian reservation, the United States has the power to and does impliedly
reserve for the Indians the water necessary to make the reservation
meaningful.
Shortly after Winters, the Ninth Circuit decided ConradInvestment
Co. v. United States.'4 As in Winters, upstream non-Indians were diverting water from a creek that flowed along Indian reservation boundaries.
Here, the Conrad Company was diverting water from Birch Creek
upstream from the Blackfeet Reservation.' 5 The court addressed the scope
of the Indian water rights. It acknowledged that future uses of the water
could not be determined, but notwithstanding this uncertainty, held that
the reservation of water for future requirements, as well as present, was
within the treaty's terms.', This holding concerned the quantity, not the
type, of reserved water use because use of the Indian water for purposes
other than irrigation and domestic needs was not at issue.' 7
In 1956, the same court cited Conrad with approval in United States
v. Ahtanum IrrigationDistrict." The Yakima Indians brought suit to
establish and quiet title to the Indians' right to the use of the waters of
Ahtanum Creek under an 1855 treaty. 9 An agreement in 1908 between
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19

207 U.S. 564 (1908).
Id at 567.
Id
Id at 576.
Id
Id at 577.
Id
161 F. 829 (9th Cir. 1908).
Id at 830.
Id at 832.
Id at 831-32.
236 F.2d 321, 326 (9th Cir. 1956).
Id at 323.
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the Chief Engineer of the Indian Irrigation Service and non-Indian water
users which specifically limited the percentage of natural water flow rights
was the crucial question."' Although speaking in the context of agricultural uses of the reserved water, the court did not mince words regarding
the validity of future uses of the reserved water: "The reservation was
not merely for present but for future use. Any other construction of the
rule in the Winters case would be wholly unreasonable."12' Consistent with
this observation, the Ahtanum court approved a flexible quantification
22
of the Indian reserved rights in order to satisfy future needs.
Although the Supreme Court recognized the existence of the Indians'
valuable water rights in 1908 and an occasional case arose invoking
Winters, neither the Indians nor the United States government, as trustee,
substantially asserted them for many years.2" Not until 1963, in Arizona
24
did Indian water rights again receive much attention. Ariv. California,
zona u. California involved adjudication of the Colorado River water
between Arizona and California. Although the Indian water rights comprised only a minor segment of the case, 25 the Court formulated an important principle defining the quantification of Indian water rights. Like
the Ninth Circuit in Conrad and Ahtanum, the Supreme Court held that
the reserved water was meant to satisfy future, as well as present,
Indian needs. 26 The Court, however, recognized the inadequacy of an openended quantification of the water rights and adopted the practically irrigable acreage standard (PIA) 27 as the only feasible method to quantifiy
water.2 8
The Court published a Supplemental Decree 29 for Arizona which
removed any doubts about the permissible uses of water rights quantified under PIA. The Court made it clear that PIA "shall constitute the
means of determining quantity of adjudicated water rights but shall not
constitute a restrictionof the usage of them to irrigation or other agricultural application" (emphasis added).2
In 1976, the Supreme Court decided the non-Indian reserved water
rights case of Cappaertv. United States.3' There, the Devil's Hole National
20. Id. at 330-31.
21. Id. at 326.
22. Id.at 327. The "needs" considered in Ahtanum were agricultural only.
23. NAT'L WATER COMM'N, supra note 1, at 474-75.
24. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
25. Id. at 595-601. They comprised 6 of 57 pages of the opinion.
26. Id. at 600.
27. The practicably irrigable acreage standard quantifies the amount of water necessary to irrigate all the land that is determined to be practicably irrigable. Determination

of which land is practicably irrigable involves technical expertise as well as a policy decision

about the meaning of "practicably." See Burness, Cummings, Gorman & Lansford, Practically IrrigableAcreage and Economic Feasibility,23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 289 (1983).

28. 373 U.S. at 601.
29. Arizona v. California, 439
30. Id. at 422.

U.S. 419 (1979).

31. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
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Monument's water rights were at issue. 2 The Cappaerts' use of water was
lowering the water in the Hole to the point of injuring the pupfish unique
to the Hole." The Court held that because one of the Monument's purposes was to preserve the pupfish, the federal government had reserved
the water necessary to preserve the pupfish.31 No more and no less water
than necessary to effectuate the purpose was reserved 35 This holding
stands for the principle that the purpose of the federal reservation defines
the scope of the water rights.
United States v. New Mexico3" further clarified the relation of the purpose of the federal reservation to its impliedly reserved water rights. In
order to determine the reserved water rights of the Gila National Forest,
the Supreme Court established a test for determining which purposes of
the National Forest created water rights.3 7 The Court held that where
water is necessary to fulfill the essential or primary purposes of the reservation, water rights arise.3 8 Where water is only valuable for a secondary
use of the federal reservation, no implied water rights attach. 39 Applying
this test, the Court found no implied water rights for the purposes of 4aes0
thetics, recreation or fish-preservation in the Gila National Forest.
In sum, the reserved water rights doctrine comprises several principles. First, when creating a reservation, Indian or otherwise, the United
States impliedly reserves sufficient water to make the reservation meaningful and viable.41 Second, the amount of reserved water is the amount
necessary to effectuate the primary purpose of the reservation." Third,
in respect to Indian reservations, recognition of the evolving nature of
a human community has led the courts to conclude that, in order to assure
the continued viability of the reservation, future needs must be accommodated.4 3 Consequently, the quantity of reserved water is not limited
8
to present needs 4" nor is the type of use restricted to specific uses.'
Treaty Purpose
The federal government's purpose in establishing Indian reservations
defines the scope of the Indian water rights. Treaties typically created
the reservation. Their interpretation is key to determining the purpose
of the reservation and the scope of the Indian water rights.
32. Id at 131.
33. I& at 136.
34. Id at 147.
35. Id
36. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
37. Id at 702.
38. Id
39. Id
40. Id at 705. It did find water rights for timber and watershed management, concluding that these were the primary purposes of the National Forests. Id at 718.
41. Winters, 207 U.S. at 577.
42. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 702.
43. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 600.
44. Ahtanum, 236 F.2d at 327.
45. Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. at 422.
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The Shoshone treaty, 6 which is at the heart of the Indian claims to
the Big Horn, is representative of many Indian treaties. In United States
v.Shoshone Tribe of Indians,47 the Supreme Court interpreted the 1868
treaty between the United States and the Shoshone tribe. Consistent with
an explicit reference in the treaty to a permanent homeland,4' the Court
held that the treaty evinced an intent to create a permanent homeland.4 9
The intent that the Shoshone reservation be a permanent homeland
was not unique to the 1868 Shoshone treaty. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly found that the purpose of Indian reservations was to provide
a place where the Indians could be self-governing and become economically self-sustaining." Although treaties differed, the words "forever" and
"permanent" were typical to describe the duration of treaty guaranteed
rights.5' Furthermore, although numerous treaties mentioned a goal of
developing farming,2 recognition of other subsistence methods of hunting and fishing was common."
The Ninth Circuit ruled on the purpose of the Colville Reservation and
its effect on the Colville Indians' water rights in Colville Confederated
Tribes v. Walton.6 4 This decision was part of a long litigation concerning
the respective rights of the Colville Confederated Tribes, the Indian allottees, and Walton, a non-Indian, to the No Name Creek Hydrological System 5
The court held that "the general purpose [of an Indian reservation],
to provide a home for the Indians, is a broad one and must be liberally
construed. "56 Applying this standard to the case, the court determined
that providing for a land-based agrarian society was not the only purpose
of the reservation. 7 Because of the traditional role of fishing in the Colville's lifestyle, preserving the tribes' access to fishing grounds was a purpose subsumed in the larger purpose of providing a home for the Indians. 5
46. Treaty with the Shoshonees and Bannacks, July 3, 1868, United States-ShoshoneesBannacks, 15 Stat. 673 [hereinafter Shoshonee Treaty].
47. 304 U.S. 111 (1938).
48. Shoshonee Treaty, supra note 46, at art. IV.
49. 304 U.S. at 116.
50. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164,174 (1973); Warren Trading Post v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 686 (1965); United States
v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111 (1938).
51. Wilkinson and Volkman, "As Long as Water Flows, or GrassGrows Upon the Earth"
- How Long a Time is That?, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 601, 602 (1975).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111 (1938) (interpreting the
Shoshonee and Bannack Treaty of 1868); Treaty with the Ute Indians, United States-Ute
Tribe, March 2, 1868,15 Stat. 619; Treaty with the Cheyenne Indians, United States-Cheyenne
Tribe-Arapahoe Tribe, May 10, 1868, 15 Stat. 655.
53. See, e.g., Washington v. Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979); Puyallup Tribe
v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968).
54. 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981) (Walton 1).
55. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 752 F.2d 397, 399 (9th Cir. 1985) (Walton II).
56. Walton I, 647 F.2d at 47.
57. Id at 48.
58. Id
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As such, the court found implied water rights to the No Name Creek for
the development and maintenance of replacement fishing grounds, as well
as for irrigation. 9
Having established a broad standard with which to evaluate the purpose and the water rights of the Indian reservation, the court then ruled
on the permissible uses of the water. Simply put, "When the Tribe has
a vested property right in reserved water, it may use it in any lawful manner." 60 As support for its holding, the court referred to the Special Master's
Report for Arizona v. California and held that "the purposes for which
the reservation was created governed the quantification of reserved water,
but not the use of such water."61
In sum, Walton provided two important holdings. First, the primary
purpose of an Indian reservation must be broadly construed and can
include several secondary purposes. Second, the purpose of the Indian
reservation does not limit the subsequent use of the water rights.
The courts have not been alone in finding that reservations were
intended to be permanent homelands. In 1924, the United States Attorney General analyzed the applicability of the General Leasing Act of 1920
to Indian land. 6 The Attorney General opined that Indian title is sacred
and that Indian possession of land through treaty reservations was for
perpetuity, excepting only some exercise of federal plenary power.6 4 He
noted that the treaties have recognized that Indians have equitable ownership of the reservations and have not limited it.6 5 With this opinion the
executive branch, like the judicial branch, acknowledged that Indian reservations were intended to be the Indians' permanent homes.
Tribal Sovereignty
The combination of tribal sovereignty and federal preemption limits
state intrusion on tribal affairs. 66 Chief Justice Marshall established the
idea of tribal sovereignty in Worcester v. Georgia.7 Tribes are "distinct,
independent political communities" within whose territories state law has
59. Id
60. Id
61. Id. (citing Report from Simon H. Rifkind, Special Master, to the Supreme Court,
265-66 Arizona v. California (December 5, 1960)).
62. 41 Stat. 437 (1920). The General Leasing Act effected a policy change from disposition of land within the public domain containing commercial quantities of minerals to leasing
of that land.
63. 34 Opp. Att'y Gen. 171 (1924).
64. Id. at 180. This referred to the Congressional power recognized in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903), to abrogate treaties.
65. 34 Opp. Att'y Gen. at 181.
66. Williams, The GovernmentalContext for Development in Indian Country:Modern
Tribal Institutions and the Bureau of IndianAffairs, in NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT
IN INDIAN COUNTRY 5 (1988.
67. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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no authority. 68 Worcester thus 69
established a territorial bar to any state
action within the reservations.
In Williams v. Lee7" the Supreme Court modified the per se territorial
bar to state action. It established an "infringement test" to determine
the validity of the state action. Where state action infringes on the right
of the reservation Indians to self-government, it is invalid. 1
The Supreme Court set forth an important test to evaluate state
infringement in Washington v. ConfederatedTribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation.72 The Indians ran a thriving business on the reservation selling state-tax free cigarettes manufactured off the reservation. 73 Washington wanted to tax the cigarettes, arguing that the Indians were simply
selling their tax-exempt status. 74 The Supreme Court agreed, holding that
a key factor in evaluating state infringement is whether the taxed revenue
is generated on the reservation.7 5 Where it is not, as with cigarettes
manufactured off the reservation,
taxation of the revenue does not infringe
8
on tribal sovereignty.
In Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana,77 the Ninth Circuit applied the
"income generated on the reservation" test to development of the reservation's natural resources. 78 Montana attempted to tax coal mined on the
Crow reservation. 79 Applying the infringement test, the court found that
revenue received from the coal mining was income generated on the reservation." Thus, state taxes on the coal, which reduced the coal's marketability, infringed on the tribal government and were struck down.81
In McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission"' the Supreme Court
further addressed when a state action affecting reservation Indians is
impermissible for lack of authority or jurisdiction. McClanahanfocused
on the federal preemption barrier to state action. 3 The Supreme Court
stressed that the federal government's influence is pervasive in the area
of Indian tribal government and that the state cannot intrude into areas
the federal government has preempted. ' Federal preemption thus became
a major factor in determining whether state jurisdiction exists.
68. Id. at 559-60.
69. Id at 561 ("The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own
territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no
force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter...").
70. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
71. Id at 220.
72. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
73. Id at 144.
74. Id at 142.
75. Id at 156-57.
76. Id at 158-59.
77. 819 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd mem., 108 S. Ct. 685 (1988).
78. Id. at 899.
79. Id at 897.
80. Id at 902.
81. Id. at 903.
82. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
83. Id at 172.
84. Id at 172-73.
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The Supreme Court's most current analysis of tribal sovereignty vis8
a-vis state action is Californiav. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians. In
Cabazon the state of California tried to apply its statute governing bingo
games to bingo games on the Indian reservation. 8 California asserted jurisdiction under Public Law 280,11 claiming that its bingo statute was criminal in nature. California's argument failed because the bingo statute was
deemed an exercise of civil regulatory authority which is invalid under
Public Law 280.88
The Court also tested California's jurisdiction under sovereigntypreemption analysis. Instead of finding an intrusion on tribal sovereignty
or a federally preempted area as conclusively invalidating state action,
the Court weighed state interests against tribal and federal interests,"9
suggesting a broadening of state jurisdiction over tribes.8 0 Nonetheless,
the barriers of federal preemption and tribal sovereignty prevailed. In
Cabazon, federal preemption was easily found, as was state infringement
on tribal sovereignty."
McCarran Amendment

2

In any discussion of state jurisdiction over Indian reserved water
rights one must consider the McCarran Amendment. The McCarran

Amendment waived federal immunity to suit in state court involving water
rights adjudication. Its purpose was to enable states to comprehensively
adjudicate their water. 3 By waiving federal immunity to state water adjudication proceedings, the Amendment allowed inclusion of federal claims
which would otherwise materially interfere with state adjudicated water
rights.8 4

In United States v. District Court In and For Eagle County,95 the

Supreme Court held that the McCarran Amendment's waiver included federal reserved water rights. 9 The Supreme Court extended the waiver to
in ColoradoRiver Water Conservainclude Indian reserved water rights
7
tion District v. United States.9
85. 107 S. Ct. 1083 (1987).
86. Id, at 1084.
87. 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1982). Public Law 280 transfers broad criminal but narrow civil
jurisdiction to the states over Indian reservations. The grant of civil jurisdiction does not
include civil regulatory authority. Bryan v. Itasca, 426 U.S. 373, 390 (1976). In respect to
jurisdiction over Indian water rights, see infra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
88. 107 S. Ct. at 1088-89.
89. Id- at 1092-95.
90. Williams, supra note 66, at 16.
91. 107 S. Ct. at 1094.
92. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1982).
93. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 551 (1983).
94. Id. See also United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520, 523
(1971) (federal reserved water rights are within the scope of the McCarran Amendment);
Colorado River Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 810 (1976) (Indian reserved
water rights are within the scope of the McCarran Amendment).
95. 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
96. I. at 524.
97. 424 U.S. 800, 811 (1976).
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In Arizona v. San CarlosApache Tribe ofArizona,98 the Supreme Court
further broadened state jurisdiction under the McCarran Amendment. It
held that state jurisdiction applies when Indian tribes, as well as the
United States, bring federal suits seeking to adjudicate only Indian water
rights.99 However, in a strongly worded paragraph, the Court warned the
states about over-stepping their jurisdictional bounds:
We also emphasize, as we did in ColoradoRiver, that our decision in no way changes the substantive law by which Indian rights
in state water adjudications must be judged. State courts, as much
as federal courts, have a solemn obligation to follow federal law.
Moreover, any state-court decision alleged to abridge Indian water
rights protected by federal law can expect to receive, if brought
for review before this Court, a particularized and exacting scrutiny commensurate with the powerful federal interest in safeguarding those rights from state encroachment {emphasis added).100
Thus, despite the McCarran Amendment, federal law continues to
govern Indian water rights; traditional barriers of tribal sovereignty and
federal preemption to state regulation of tribal property persist.
ANALYSIS

Analysis of the scope of Indian water rights has several components.
Determining the treaty purpose lays the foundation for the water rights.
Then caselaw regarding future uses of Indian water must be discussed.
Next, consideration of tribal sovereignty and state jurisdiction over Indian
water use is vital because of the inherent conflict between existent state
water administration and developing Indian water uses. Finally, evaluation of practical effects of Indian water export rounds out the analysis.
Proponents of limiting Indian uses of their water by, for example, not
allowing exportation, insist that Indian reservations had a narrow pur10
Where agriculture was
pose with correspondingly limited water rights.°
important for sustenance, irrigation water was reserved; where fishing
was important, sufficient water for fishing was reserved.10 2 Thus, they
argue, any use of water beyond those limited needs is invalid.' 3
UnitedStates v. New Mexico, 0 4 with its holding that only the primary
purposes of federal reservations have implied water rights, appears at first
glance to provide support to the argument for a narrow purpose. Important distinctions exist, however, between national forest reservations and
Indian reservations, rendering this test inappropriate for determining
98. 463 U.S. 545 (1983).
99. Id at 570.
100. Id at 571.
101. DePalma, ConsiderationsandConclusions Concerningthe Transferabilityof Indian
Water Rights, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 91, 93-94 (1980).
102. Id at 94.
103. Id
104. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
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Indian reserved water rights. 05 Several courts have noted the difference
between standards governing non-Indian federal reserved water rights
and those governing Indian reserved water rights and consequently questioned the validity of strictly applying the New Mexico test to Indian
water rights. 10 6 One authority suggests that the relevant test to ascertain Indian water rights should not be whether a particular use is primary
it is completely outside the scope of an Indian
or secondary, but whether
10 7
reservation's purpose.
Even if the New Mexico test is applied, the permanent homeland purpose of the Indian reservation has been found to be the primary purpose.
The court in Walton applied the New Mexico test.0 8 Nonetheless, it found
the primary purpose to be the creation of a permanent homeland." 9 In
order to quantify the water rights, the court found the narrower purposes
of agriculture and fishery maintenance as well." 0 However, the primary
permanent homeland purpose determined the use of the water rights. The
court noted: "Permitting the Indians to determine how to use reserved
water is consistent with the general purpose for the creation of the Indian
homeland - providing a homeland for the survival and growth of the
Indians and their way of life.""'
The holdings in Conrad,"' Ahtanum," 3 and Arizona"4 in respect to
future use of water on the Indian reservation are consistent with an evolving, permanent homeland purpose. Because the reservation was to be a
permanent homeland, water uses would necessarily change and develop.
Thus future needs and uses must be accommodated and not limited by
past uses. The Supreme Court's explicit statement in its Supplemental
Decree for Arizona that water rights quantified by PIA were not restricted
to agricultural uses" 5 left no doubt that uses would be allowed to change
as needs changed.
The various provisions in treaties for hunting and fishing rights,"'
as well as agricultural needs, also indicate that the federal government's
over-arching purpose was to create a permanent Indian homeland, with
all the diversity and change which that designation encompasses. The
government was not singlemindedly set on transforming all Indians into
farmers for perpetuity. There was some flexibility in the nature of the permanent homeland. The common denominator of the treaties, logically their
105. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 583 (1982).
106. See BigHorn,753 P.2d at 96; State ex ret Greeley v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 712 P.2d 754, 766-68 (Mont. 1985); United States v. Adair,
723 F.2d 1394, 1408 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984).
107. COHEN, supra note 105, at 584.
108. 647 F.2d at 47.

109. Id.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 48.
Id. at 49.
161 F. at 832.
236 F.2d at 327.
373 U.S. at 600.
439 U.S. at 422.

116. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
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primary purpose, was to provide a place where the Indians could be selfgoverning and self-sufficient. The primary purpose was no narrower.
The social and intellectual history of the treaty-making era sheds light
on whether the federal government envisioned an evolving, rather than
static, homeland. The second half of the nineteenth century witnessed the
7
ascendency of Darwinism with its theory of evolution." Two of the
8
nation's foremost anthropologists, Lewis Morgan" and John Wesley
Powell,"' reflected this influence, expounding on the progressionof human
civilization from savagery through barbarism to civilization.' 20
This idea that human beings had specific stages through which they
had to progress in the process of civilization, influenced the government's
22
2
actions and statements.' ' Secretary of the Interior Carl Schurz's' comments reflected the government's views:
To be sure, as to Indian civilization, we must not expect too rapid
progress of the attainment of too lofty a standard. We can certainly not transform them at once into great statesmen, or
merchants, but we can make
philosophers, or manufacturers, or
123
them small farmers and herders.
The ultimate goal of complete civilization and assimiliation 21 stood intimately linked with the belief that intermediate steps, specifically becoming pastoral, were necessary.
The fact that some treaties focused on the establishment of an agricultural community thus indicates only that the government sought to foster
a move by the Indians to the next stage in their development. The government was not trying to limit Indian development at the agricultural stage,
but simply believed that an agricultural lifestyle was the requisite intermediate step to civilization. The government in fact contemplated that
117. R. HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 4-5 (1959) (Darwin's
published in 1859. It was quickly and enthusiastically received
in the United States and applied to biology and society).
118. See generally READER'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN WEST 771-72 (H. Lamar
ed. 1977) [hereinafter Lamar] (biographical background of Lewis Morgan).
119. See generally Id at 957-59 (biographical background of John Wesley Powell).
120. See L. MORGAN, ANCIENT SOCIETY (1878) (An extended analysis of Indian societies
which expounded Morgan's theories of society developing linearly through the stages of barbarism, savagery and then to civilization); F. HoxlE, BEYOND SAVAGERY: THE CAMPAIGN
ORIGIN OP THE SPECIES was

TO ASSIMILATE THE AMERICAN INDIANS,

1880-1920 (1977) (Analyzing the beliefs and influence

of Powell in relation to Indian policy).
121. F. HoxIE, BEYOND SAVAGERY:
INDIANS,

THE CAMPAIGN

TO ASSIMILATE

THE AMERICAN

1880-1920 47 (1977).

122. Lamar, supra note 118, at 1091.

123. Schurz, PresentAspects of the Indian Problem, in AMERICANIZING

THE AMERICAN

15 (F. Prucha ed. 1973).
124. Assimilation of the Indians into American society so that the Indians would be
"indistinguishable from his white brothers" was a goal of various reformers and statesmen
alike in the second half of the nineteenth century. II F. PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER 610
(1984). See generally AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS (F. Prucha ed. 1973) (edited
writings from 1880-1900 on the various issues surrounding Indian assimilation).
INDIANS
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the reservation would ultimately be used by the assimilated Indians for
the myriad of activities in which the "civilized" American society participates."5
The "purpose" limitation to federal water rights therefore should not
restrict Indian water use solely to irrigation. First, binding caselaw holds
that future Indian needs are to be accommodated. 2 6 Second, in the PIA
context the Supreme Court has expressly held that the method of quantifying water rights which is based on the expected initial type of use of
the reservation does not restrict the type of future uses. 12 Finally, policy
arguments for restricted use, urging that the purpose of the Indian reservation was purely to establish an agricultural community, are inaccurate.
The purpose of the reservation was to create a permanent homeland, no
more, no less. To be permanent, the homeland must evolve, as will its water
uses. Any use that benefits the Indians, economically or socially, in
developing their homeland furthers the treaty's intent to provide a permanent, self-sustaining Indian homeland. Depending on the prevailing
societal needs, technology and economy, these uses might include industry, instream flow or exportation. The federal government reserved the
water rights for all such uses.
Due to historical state administration " 8 and the lack of federal regulation, state attempts to restrict Indian sale and export of their reserved
water are a reality.1 9 Because the McCarran Amendment gives the states
the authority to adjudicate Indian water rights, 30 the state courts may
place restrictions on tribal water rights. The question thus arises whether
the states have the authority to place limits on the type, as well as the
quantity of Indian water use, in their exercise of water adjudication power.
The historic barriers to state authority over Indian reservations are federal preemption and tribal sovereignty. In order to determine whether they
preclude state jurisdiction over Indian water rights, one must evaluate
the various factors in the water exportation scenario.
Federal preemption is pervasive, strong and conclusive in the area of
Indian water rights. First, the federal government impliedly reserved
water rights for Indians. 3' This reservation of Indian water rights was
expansive, including not only the rights to current use, but also future
use. 3 2 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that the federal act of
125. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 119 (Thomas, J.,dissenting).
126. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 601.
127. Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. at 422.
128. NAT'L WATER COMM'N, supra note 1, at 459.
129. The states of California, Nevada and Arizona, for example, are seeking restrictions
on the Colorado Ute Water Settlement provisions for Indian exportation of water. See Joint
Statements of Department of Water Resources of Arizona, Colorado River Board of California, and Colorado River Commission of Nevada on H.B. 2642, before the Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs, September 16, 1987, reprinted in NATURAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT
IN INDIAN COUNTRY (1988).
130. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1982). See supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
131. Winters, 207 U.S. at 564.
132. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 597.
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reserving water rights is of such importance and supremacy that it will
recognize the reservation of water rights without equities to state water
rights."'
Public Law 28013 also establishes Congress' preemption in the area
of Indian water rights. Although Public Law 280 facilitates transfer of
jurisdiction to states under specific circumstances, "' Congress specifically
stated that Public Law 280 did not allow alienation, encumbrance or regulation of water rights in a manner inconsistent with any federal action. 136
Clearly, Congress did not relinquish its interest in the area of water rights.
Thus, even where Congress was limiting its own jurisdiction and expanding the states', it specifically refused to do so in respect to water rights.
Other federal legislation pertains to the issue of federal preemption.
For example, the Indian Financing Act,'37 the Indian Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act of 1975,1"8 and the Indian Child Welfare
Act 13 9 all evince Congress' intent to encourage Indian tribal economic and
governmental self-sufficiency. 4 0 Because water rights are vital and valuable,' the ability to use them fully and in an economically beneficial manner could contribute significantly to the development of a self-sustaining
Indian economy and community. " 2 State attempts to prohibit Indians
from marketing their water, a possible source of significant revenue and
capital development, then intrude into an area Congress has preempted.
Weighing the federal interests against the state's interests under
Cabazon's test for determining the validity of state action indicates state
action is improper when it attempts to prohibit export. The tribal interests,
supported by federal interests, are strong whereas the state interests are
weak. Arguably, water is much more important to the development of
tribal self-sufficiency than bingo and, as discussed, federal preemption
in the area of Indian self-sufficiency is pervasive. On the other hand, the
state interest of getting free water, instead of paying for it, is reciprocally weak.'14 Export and sale of non-Indian water are not so deleterious
to the state that they prohibited it outright.'" In other words, although
it may be preferable to keep water in-state, this interest is not so strong
133. Id ("[W]e are not convinced by Arizona's argument that each reservation is so much
like a State that its rights to water should be determined by the doctine of equitable apportionment.").
134. 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1982).
135. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
136. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b).
137. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1543 (1982).
138. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n (1982).
139. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1982).
140. See COHEN, supra note 105, at 180-206.
141. NAT'L WATER COMM'N, supra note 1, at 39-40.
142. Getches, Managing and Marketing Indian Water, 58 U. COLO. L. REv. 515, 516-17
(1988).
143. Cf. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668 (1979) (Where the government
can exercise eminent domain power and pay for the necessary property, the argument invoking
the "easement by necessity" doctrine is not available.). Similarly the argument invoking
state needs for water should not be available where money could buy the water rights.
144. NAT'L WATER COMM'N, supra note 1, at 260.
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that the state has taken every action to further it. By prohibiting sale
of Indian water, the state is infringing on Indian self-government in the
quest for free water to which it has no legal right.' 4 That cannot be a valid
state interest.
States and those opposing Indian sale of water adamantly argue that
they are fighting to keep the water available to state users.'4 6 Allowing
the Indians to sell their water does not, however, lead to the inevitable
result that the water is not available to the state. Although it is quite
possible that better-financed commercial users could outbid state agricultural users, people within the state could pay the market price just as those
outside of the state could. More importantly, if it is the state's interest
to make the water available to its agricultural users the state should buy
the Indian water and thereby keep the water in-state.
The sovereignty prong to barring state action rests on the Williams'
test of infringement on tribal self-government. Given that water rights
are the sine qua non for any development and existence in the West,""
they are central to tribal self-government. Limits on their use thus necessarily infringe on the tribal government.
The "income generated on the reservation" factor of the infringement
analysis 4 8 also applies. Minerals belong to the Indians'" and as such are
resources whose development and sale are not subject to the state action
of taxation.'50 Likewise, water rights belong to the Indians.' 5' By analogy, water rights, whose sale and export would be "income generated on
the reservation," should not be subject to state action, specifically restrictions on sale and export.
States clearly have little room to exercise jurisdiction over Indian
reserved water rights. The McCarran Amendment appears to have muddied, rather than cleared, the waters. Because it gave the states the power
to quantify and adjudicate Indian water rights, states have attempted
to extend that power to limit the type of Indian water use. The principles
145. In prior appropriation systems, which prevail in the western United States, water
is a species of property. Once a potential water user has met the requirements of intent to
use water beneficially, diversion of that water, actual beneficial use of the water, and any
other state procedural requirements, the appropriation is complete. A water user with a priority date more recent than another user's may only use water if the rights of the user with
the older, that is more senior, permit are satisfied. However, because water rights are a form
of property, they may be sold, assigned or mortgaged. They also cannot be taken involuntarily by state or federal governments without just compensation. D. GETCHES, WATER LAW
IN A NUTSHELL 78-79, 87-88 (1984.
146. DePalma, supra note 101.
147. NAT'L WATER COMM'N, supra note 1, at 39.

148. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
134, 155 (1980).
149. United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 118 (1938).
150. Crow Tribe v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 1987), affd mer, 108 S. Ct
685 (1988). See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
151. State ex reL Greeley v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai, 712 P.2d 754, 761 (Mont.
1985).
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of tribal sovereignty and federal preemption, however, forbid such extension. The states do not have jurisdiction to dictate the type of Indian water
use, only the quantity.
In sum, the principles of sovereignty and preemption bar states from
exercising legislative or judicial powers which infringe on tribal governments and intrude into areas which the federal government has preempted.
Restrictions on sale and export of Indian reserved water rights both
infringe on tribal self-government and intrude into areas the federal
government has preempted. As such they are invalid and impermissible.
Having discussed the legal theories which support allowing Indians
to market their water, several practical and economic factors should be
considered.
Arguments that Indian export and sale of water will negatively and
inequitably affect non-Indian water users merit discussion. It is true that
there may be less free, unused Indian water running through the ditches.
That alone, however, does not justify restricting Indian use, 152 nor is it
necessarily accurate. Relations between non-Indians and Indians have long
been uneasy.'53 As a result, it is not inconceivable that Indians might be
less than conservative with their own water, having little motivation during a drought to concern themselves with ensuring that the non-Indians
downstream get free water.154 On the other hand, if the Indians received
consideration for a specified amount of their water, the Indians would have
incentive to monitor their water use and ensure that the buyers of their
water received it. Such a situation would allow more certainty for nonIndians and more fairness to the Indians. The non-Indians could buy that
amount of Indian water on which they relied, if the Indians so desired,
instead of relying on a vacillating and possibly non-existent source of free
water. The Indians, on their part, would be receiving full value for their
resources.
Other economic benefits to non-Indians associated with allowing sale
and export also argue in favor of Indian export. Although the short-term
appeal of free water is attractive, in the long term, free water to which
one has no right is not beneficial. Commentators have warned of the
deleterious effects of uncertainty as to water. 155 Non-Indian mineral and
other development is less appealing because of the uncertain water sup152. P. MAXFIELD, M. DIETERICH & F. TRELEASE, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW ON AMERICAN INDIAN LANDS 212 (1977) (hereinafter MAXFIELDI.
153. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) ("Because of the local
ill-feeling, the people of the States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies.").
154. See, e.g., Casper Star Tribune, July 16, 1988, at 1, col. 1 (Report on the BIA cutting off water to non-Indian reservation ranchers at the request of the Wind River Indians.
Although not specifically alleging intentional Indian water waste during the drought of 1988,
non-Indian ranchers voiced their opinions that there was enough water around for everyone; waste was occurring).
155. NAT'L WATER COMM'N, supra note 1, at 483. The National Water Commission
strongly encouraged developing a system where Indian water rights could be sold, exported
and transferred believing that such a system was vital to resolution of conflicts and maximizing the water resource.
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ply.' Little motivation exists to invest heavily when an essential resource
may suddenly and unexpectedly dry up.'57 Buying or leasing a part of that
renewable resource creates much greater certainty and assurance.
By the same token, the Indian economy would benefit significantly
from an ability to market tribal water."58 Presently, many tribes are receiving no value for their resource.'59 A major problem tribes face in their attempts to become self-sufficient and create their own economies is the lack
of capital to fund development. 160 Selling or leasing water would be an
immediate source of capital and provide some of the funds necessary to
develop their reservations. 16' Some may argue that selling a resource will
only diminish the Indian reservation. 6 2 That proposition, however, fails
to recognize two key points. First, the disposition of water rights need
not be permanent.'63 They may be limited in time. Second, and more important, if the movement is towards encouraging Indian self-sufficiency, such
paternalism of deciding for the Indians what is good for them is highly
inappropriate. The Indians should be free to do as they wish with their
own resources within the bounds of developing a self-sufficient homeland.
In a judicial setting, where Winters, Arizona, San Carlos, and Cabazon
are binding, Indians should not be prohibited from selling and exporting
their water. Economic and equitable policy considerations likewise favor
allowing some Indian water export, just as non-Indian water export is
allowed. There is, however, a need for some regulation of Indian water
users as there is for state water users. Although the influence of the free
market on the water resource will have benefits, an entirely unregulated
market of this vital resource is cause for alarm.' Further, a practical and
workable resolution for the conflicting rights and needs of Indian and nonIndian water users is essential.
Several states and Indian tribes have chosen negotiation rather than
litigation as the means to achieve a mutually satisfactory agreement.'65
This bilateral rather than unilateral decision making process makes sense.
Both parties' concerns can be addressed with concessions and benefits
balanced as the parties deem beneficial. Under one settlement, Indians
156. MAXFIELD, supra note 152, at 212; Comment, IndianReserved Water Rights: The
Winters of our Discontent, 188 YALE L. J. 1689 (1979).
157. MAXFIELD, supra note 152, at 212.
158. Id.
159. Getches, supra note 142, at 516.
160. Id. at 544.
161. R. Collins, Speech at Symposium on Indian Water Policy in a Changing Environment, reprintedin AMERICAN INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM, INDIAN WATER POLICY
84 (1982).
162. Getches, supra note 142, at 542.
163. NAT'L WATER COMM'N, supra note 1, at 481.
164. DePalma, supra note 101, at 95-96 (suggesting that export of Indian water will
greatly increase the amount of water consumptively used by Indian water holders); GETCHES,
supra note 145, at 163 (Explaining the reasons for state restriction on transbasin diversions
of state water rights, he notes that the "economy, ecology, lifestyle, and potential for future
growth of an area can change greatly with massive exports of water").
165. See Shupe, supra note 4, at 5-8 (Negotiations and settlements have been undertaken
in Arizona, California, Colorado and Washington).
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gained immediate help in water development in return for certain restrictions on use of their water rights. 6 In another negotiation, the state has
offered to pay the Indians for a ninety-nine year lease of their water
rights.1 67 Specific limits on export could likewise be worked out in return
for some compensation or benefit. 168 Further, through Congressional
approval of the settlement, potential problems regarding contracts
between Indians and non-Indians can be averted.'69
Through negotiation, fair and realistic resolutions can be attained.
Treaty rights would be recognized. They might subsequently be limited,
but only in return for other benefits. Above-board exchanges between the
state and the tribe could occur resulting in a fair and mutually beneficial
resolution.
BIG HORN REVISITED

In Re the GeneralAdjudicationof All Rights to Use Water in the Big
Horn River System 70 is the recent Wyoming Supreme Court decision
determining the Indian reserved water rights in the Big Horn river system.
After affirming its jurisdiction,"' the court found that there was a
reserved water right for the Wind River Reservation.1' This required the
Wyoming Supreme Court to investigate the purpose of the Indian reservation in order to quantify the Indian water rights.' 7 The court noted
the law from the pertinent cases and accepted the proposition that the
amount of water impliedly reserved7 4is determined by the purposes for
which the reservation was created.'
Turning to the treaty which created the Shoshone reservation, the
court had no difficulty affirming the district court's finding that the
Shoshone reservation had a solely agricultural purpose when it was
created.'7 The court dismissed the reference in the treaty to creating a
"permanent homeland" as not determinative and instead focused on scattered references to an "agricultural reservation."'" 76 Consequently, the
rights for mineral, industrial, fishery, wildcourt refused to grant water
7
life or aesthetic purposes.' "
166. H.R. 2642, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
167. Shupe, supra note 4, at 6 (the Tucson City Council offered to purchase 8,000 acrefeet per year water rights from the Tohono O'odham on a 99 year lease basis).
168. See MONT. CODE ANN. §85-20-201 (1987) (the Fort Peck-Montana Compact provided
for state approval of Indian water sale).
169. See Shupe, supra note 4, at 4-5 (the Indian Non-Intercourse Acts, 25 U.S.C. § 177,
invalidate transfer of land by Indian nations and tribes unless Congress has authorized the
transaction. It is unclear whether water is covered by these acts, but general consensus holds
that it is. Thus Congressional approval is probably necessary for a valid sale.). See also
Getches, supra note 142, at 542.
170. 753 P.2d 76.
171. Id. at 88.
172. Id at 94.
173. Id
174. Id
175. Id at 97.
176. ld.
177. Id at 98-99.
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The court then briefly discussed the scope of the reserved water
right. 178 On the issue of exportation the court let stand the district court's
holding which prohibited sale and exportation from the reservation.7 9
The correct handling of the issue of Indian export and sale of their
reserved water rights would be as follows. The first step in the analysis
is to determine the intent of the treaty creating the Wind River Reservation. As the Supreme Court interpreted it in United States v. Shoshone
Tribe of Indians,1 the treaty created a reservation for the Shoshone which
was to be their "permanent home.""' The Court supported this finding
by holding that the minerals and timber on the reservation belonged to
the Indians and could not be taken without compensation. 82 Certainly,
if the reservation's only purpose was to establish a place where the Indians
could be agricultural rather than a permanent homeland, it would not have
been important that the minerals were taken since the Indians were to
be solely agricultural, not industrial.
A common sense understanding of what a permanent homeland entails
supports the holding that the treaty did not create a permanently agricultural community but a permanent homeland with all the diversity which
that designation denotes. Justice Thomas' dissent in Big Horn stated it
well:
[Ilt assumes that the Indian peoples will not enjoy the same style
of evolution as other people, nor are they to have the benefits of
modern civilization. I would understand that the homeland concept assumes that the homeland will not be a static place frozen
in an instant of time but that the homeland will evolve and will
be used in different ways as the Indian society develops.'
Unfortunately, the Wyoming Supreme Court decided that the Indian
reservation had a narrow agricultural purpose and no other."" The correct approach would recognize that the treaty's purposes should be
broadly construed and then accept the legally supported,"' as well as logically and historically sound conclusion that the Shoshone reservation was
to be a permanent homeland, not a permanent agricultural community.
Neither the Wyoming Supreme Court nor the State Engineer has jurisdiction to limit the sale and export of Shoshone and Arapahoe, 1 6 water.
178. IM at 99-100.
179. Id. at 100. The court also noted that the Tribes did not affirmatively seek permission to export reserved water and that the United States conceded no federal law permits
sale of reserved water to non-Indians off the reservation.
180. 304 U.S. 111 (1938).
181. Id. at 113.
182. I& at 118.
183. 753 P.2d at 119 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

184. Id. at 99.
185. See supra notes 104-21 and accompanying text.
186. The Wind River Reservation was created for the Shoshone, but the federal govern-

ment later moved the Arapahoe to the Shoshone reservation. Today both tribes share the
reservation. See Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. at 112.
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Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe8 7 clearly states that "[sltate courts
.. have a solemn obligation to follow federal law" while adjudicating
Indian water rights.8 8 Therefore, Wyoming may not impose or create its
own law to prevent Indian export of water, notwithstanding that it has
jurisdiction under the McCarran Amendment to quantify the water rights.
The federal cases of Conrad,"' Ahtanum, ,90 Arizona"' and Walton"2 hold
that present uses do not restrict future uses. Thus, Wyoming is prohibited
from limiting Indian use by relying on past or present on-reservation,
agricultural uses.
Tribal sovereignty and federal preemption likewise indicate that
Wyoming does not have the authority to limit exercise of Indian water
rights to the reservation. As discussed above, tribal and federal interests
in the freedom to export water are significant.193 In respect to the state
interest, the Big Horn flows for a significant stretch within Wyoming after
leaving the Wind River Reservation.194 Exporting the water from the reservation does not necessarily require export from the state. Thus Wyoming's
valid interest of keeping the water within the state may still be satisfied
even if the Indians export the water from the reservation. Further, to prevent export from the state, Wyoming could pay for the water just as nonWyoming water users could. It is not beyond Wyoming's power to keep
the water in-state without infringing on the Tribes.
In balance then, the Indian interests of autonomy, as supported by
the tribal sovereignty and federal preemption doctrines, outweigh the state
interests of keeping the water in Wyoming without paying for it, thereby
rendering invalid state restrictions on Indian export and sale of their
water. Thus, the Wyoming Supreme Court should have reversed the district court's restrictions.
Finally, practical and economic considerations suggest that such restrictions would not be beneficial to Wyoming. Common sense indicates
that if water has greater monetary value for the Indians, which an
expanded export market would undoubtedly cause, they will use their
water carefully. The result could well be more useable water for Wyoming.
Furthermore, it behooves Wyoming, a state with a depressed economy
hoping to attract industry, to heed the suggestion that allowing sale of
Indian water rights outside of the reservation would encourage development.
In conclusion, Big Horn would have been a fine case to clearly set forth
applicable law and sound thinking on the treaty's purpose, tribal
sovereignty and the practical effects of sale and export of Indian reserved
187. 463 U.S. 545 (1983).
188. Id. at 571.
189. 161 F. at 832.
190. 236 F.2d at 337.
191. 373 U.S. at 600.
192. Walton 1, 647 F.2d at 48.
193. See supra notes 131-51 and accompanying text.
194. About 125 miles. Telephone conversation with Wyoming State Engineer's Office
(October 21, 1988).
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water rights. These factors indicate that the Wyoming Supreme Court
should have reversed the district court in its brief opinion that the Indians
could not sell or export their water off-reservation. It should have held
that any per se restriction on sale and export does not comport with treaty
intent, existent case law, state jurisdiction, or even necessarily the best
interests of the Indians or the non-Indians in Wyoming. I95
CONCLUSION

Law, logic, and integrity support the Indians' right to sell and export
their water. The Shoshone treaty, and others, sought to create a permanent home for the Indians. The established law gives the Indians the right
to use the water for that purpose. A well-rounded and common-sense
interpretation of the purpose of the treaties demands that the type of
allowable use of Indian water not be restricted. A permanent homeland
necessarily evolves as the people and the surrounding environment evolve.
Allowing sale and export of Indian water in fact fulfills the intention of
the treaties since, along with providing a permanent homeland, the federal government sought to civilize the Indians. Consequently, the water
reserved for Indian use may be used for that myriad of useful activities,
be it irrigation, commercial sale or other beneficial use, in which our "civilized" society participates.
The principles of tribal sovereignty and federal preemption likewise
support Indian use of their quantified water rights in economically beneficial ways, free from state interference. Recent federal law seeks to promote Indian enterprise. Sale of water is such enterprise. In balancing the
state and tribal interests, the outcome weighs heavily in favor of the tribes,
precluding state assertions of power to limit Indian sale and export.
Economic considerations also support opening this resource to the free
market. Indians and non-Indians alike could benefit from the action of
the free market on this valuable resource.
As to integrity, some Indians believe that "[njothing less than the
future of the tribes' permanent homelands is at stake" in the exercise of
their reserved water rights. 196 If the United States is to avoid perpetuating one of the "sorrier chapters" of history'97 or the "gross national
hypocrisy, "1198 the government and its citizens should do so now, in an area
so vital to Indian survival. It is time to deal fairly, not arbitrarily, with
the Indians; their right to full use, including sale and export, of the rights
that are "legally as well as morally"' 99 theirs must be acknowledged. After
195. The United States Supreme Court has the opportunity to rule in this manner. The
State of Wyoming as well as the Shoshone and Arapahoe have applied for a writ of certiorari,
raising the issue of exportation among others. 753 P.2d 76, petition for cert. filed, 57 U.S.L.W.
3161 {U.S. Aug. 18, 1988) (No. 88-309).
196. AMERICAN INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM, INDIAN WATER POLICY 10 (1982).
197. NAT'L WATER COMM'N, supra note 1, at 475.
198. Ahtanum, 236 F.2d at 338.
199. NAT'L WATER COMM'N, supra note

1,

at 480.
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recognition of the broad scope of Indian water rights, which caselaw, logic
and integrity mandate, negotiation between states and tribes can offer
a fair, mutually agreeable resolution to the conflicts inherent in this scramble for a vital, limited resource. Because the parties have different needs,
settlements minimizing hardships and maximizing benefits are possible
and should be the goal.
CHRISTINE LICHTENFELS
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